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Security against Denial-of-Service

This service is for assisting in preventing a denial of service. This is not a service that can be invoked programmatically; rather it is a service that must be designed into the capabilities of a Security Domain or the implementations deployed within the domain.

Key definitions:

denial of service: 1. The prevention of authorized access to resources or the delaying of time-critical operations. [2382-pt.8] 2. The result of any action or series of actions that prevents any part of an information system (IS) from functioning. [INFOSEC-99]

The overall issue is to understand what can allow denial-of-service and then to take steps to mitigate the causes. There are several general categories of denial-of-service attacks that need to be well understood:

·       Resource exhaustion: Resource exhaustion is a denial-of-service attack that causes required resources to be un-available for the intended use when a valid transaction needs to be processed. The recent SYN FLOOD attacks represents a well known denial-of-service attack.

Resources that can be exhausted are virtual connections, memory, serial ports, TCP ports, etc. However these could be generalized into two categories: connectivity resources and computational resources.

·       Buffer overflow: This type of attack causes a memory overrun to occur within a computational resource. The end result is typically the computational process terminates or becomes unstable. In reality, this attack exploits poorly implemented programs that actually allow for the overrun to occur without being properly trapped. Recent examples of this type of attack are the PING OF DEATH and some attacks on SNMP.

·       Protocol oversights: In some protocols, not all state transitions may be defined. Exploitation of such oversights could allow a denial of service attack to cause a protocol deadlock situation.

As an example, from STD 62 (SNMP):

“Denial of Service

A Security Model need not attempt to address the broad range of attacks by which service on behalf of authorized users is denied. Indeed, such denial-of-service attacks are in many cases indistinguishable from the type of network failures with which any viable management protocol must cope as a matter of course.”

Basically is a statement that no DOS countermeasures need to be taken within the specification. This is typical of most standards.

·       Improper Coding Practice: Both the Buffer Overflow and Protocol Oversight threats are sub-categories of the improper coding practice category. However, this category includes improper use of semaphores, threads, etc. that could be utilized to decrease performance/resource available to the point that a valid transaction could not be processed in a timely manner.

 

Technological Assessment and Relevant Specifications

In order to provide a denial-of-service attack protection, inter-domain connection points need to be well designed and monitored.

For connectivity resources, it is recommended that timeouts be implemented that are based upon valid traffic being transmitted/received through the connection point. Additionally, it is recommended that through policy or coding practice that a peer remote is limited to the number of connectivity resources that it is allowed to consume.

For protocol oversights, it is recommended that prior to implementation the protocol(s) are analyzed for vulnerabilities and that these be addressed during the implementation phase. It is recommended that appropriate coding methodology be employed to prevent CPU resource exhaustion as well as protocol oversight vulnerabilities.

It is also recommended that as part of the policy/SMI of a security domain that implementations are tested for vulnerabilities with tools that are publicly available.

Table 30: Relevant Specifications regarding Denial-of-Service

Identification Number

Name

Comment

ISO/IEC 17799:2000 

Information technology -- Code of practice for information security management

 

ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996

Information technology -- Guidelines for the management of IT Security -- Part 1: Concepts and models for IT Security

 

ISO/IEC TR 13335-2:1997

Information technology -- Guidelines for the management of IT Security -- Part 2: Managing and planning IT Security

 

 

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