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Credential Renewal Service

In many scenarios, a job initiated by a user may take longer than the life span of the user’s initially delegated credential. In those cases, the user needs the ability to be notified prior to expiration of the credentials, or the ability to refresh those credentials such that the job can be completed.

It is worthy to note that the Credential Renewal service provides some of the capability of User and Group Management service. However, it does not include how to revoke or initially allocate the credentials. However, in general it is a Security Domain and IntelliGrid Architecture issue in regards to the period of time required for credential renewal.

Performing a more in-depth analysis of the credential renewal process, the general issues are:

·       Determining when the credentials need to be renewed. This is typically a Security Domain’s policy issue.

·       Determining a mechanism to detect a credential that needs to be renewed.

·       Provide a mechanism for credential renewal.

 

OASIS specifies several different types of credentials that need to be considered for renewal. Each has different aspects to renewal. The IntelliGrid Architecture relevant types are:

·       Internet Protocol based credentials are related solely to address resolution as the credential. Address spoofing is a prevalent threat in IntelliGrid Architecture environment and therefore the use of this credential mechanism is not suggested.

In order to renew an addressed based credential, address-to-name resolution is required as well as appropriate security on such resolution requests.

·       InternetProtocolPassword makes use of username/password as well as address resolution to establish credentials.

This credential methodology has the same issues with address credential renewal as well as verifying that the password is viable or in need of renewal.

·       Password makes use of a username/password combination in the clear.

Username/Password management is a major issue that needs to be resolved.

·       PasswordProtectedTransport makes use of an encrypted transport to transmit a username/password combination (e.g. HTTPS conveying a username/password).

·       SmartCard renewal is strictly a policy and SMI issue. The policy must address when a SmartCard must be renewed and the mechanism for performing a renewal.

·       SmartCardPKI renewal adds the issue of digital certificate renewal to the need to renew a particular Smart Card. Since most digital certificates have an expiration date, it is the certificate date that should take precedence in the renewal process (e.g. policy may be able to ignore the renewal of the card itself). However, this is not the case if the SmartCardPKI solution is being used as a Personal Identification card that requires visual inspection for physical access.

·       SoftwarePKI uses digital certificates and therefore certificate renewal is the major issue.

·       TimesyncToken is a hardware token that is used to generate a unique token as a credential.

·       Visual Person Identification Card used with visual inspection to provide physical access control.

Any credential type that can be used to obtain physical access based upon visual inspection need to be replaced or modified in a timely manner. The periodicity of the change is dependent upon the Security Domain’s policies.

 

 

Technological Assessment and Relevant Specifications

There are certain general recommendations that can be made:

·       When using address resolution and TCP/IP, make use of the Domain Name Service and an authenticated Directory server. Dynamic address assignment should be the preferred mechanism with the resulting address being placed in the authenticated directory server.

·       Visual Credentials should be replaced/modified on a time period based upon the Security Domain’s policy. It may be less expensive to adopt a modification, as opposed to a replace strategy (e.g. the same model as automobile license tabs versus license plates).

·       Smart Cards should include a renewal date as part of the information that is contained on the card. This field should encrypt and digitally signed so that tampering can be detected. As the Smart Card is used, advanced notification of the need for renewal needs to be given to the holder.

·       Certificate based technologies: X.509 certificates are the recommended certificate type. Certificates should be accessible via PKCS#10 interfaces. The date of certificate lifetime expiration should be used as the renewal date. As the certificate is used, advanced notification of the need for renewal needs to be given to the holder.

·       Biometric based technologies need to have renewal dates based upon the Security Domain’s policy.

Specific Recommendations

Certificates

It is recommended that RFC 2797 or RFC 2560 (OCSP) to determine if the certificate needs to be renewed. If neither of these is possible, then it becomes a local Security Domain/implementation issue.

Certificate renewal should be performed via RFC 2797 when possible.

Table 11: Relevant Specification regarding Credential Renewal

Identification Number

Name

Comment

ISO 9735-9:2002  

Electronic data interchange for administration, commerce and transport (EDIFACT) -- Application level syntax rules (Syntax version number: 4, Syntax release number: 1) -- Part 9: Security key and certificate management message (message type- KEYMAN)

 

NERC

Certificate Policy for the Energy Market Access and Reliability Certificate (e‑MARC) Program Version 2.4

Available from:

ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/cip/pkitf/e-MARC-PKI_draft_version_V2-4b_March_2003-rev1.doc

 

OASIS Security Technical Committee

Authentication Context

Available from:

http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/6539/sstc-saml-authn-context-2.0-draft-04a-diff.pdf

 

RFC 2459

Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile

 

RFC 2511

Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format

 

RFC 2560

X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP

 

RFC 2797

Certificate Management Messages over CMS

 

RFC 2875

Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms

 

RFC 2986

http://www.armware.dk/RFC/rfc/rfc2986.htmlPKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7

 

RFC 3280

Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile

 

RFC 3369

Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)

 

RFC 3647

Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework

 

RFC 1591

http://www.armware.dk/RFC/rfc/rfc1591.htmlDomain Name System Structure and Delegation      

 

RFC 1608

Representing IP Information in the X.500 Directory

Recommended

RFC 1612

DNS Resolver MIB Extensions

Recommended

RFC 2230

Key Exchange Delegation Record for the DNS

 

RFC 2276

Architectural Principles of Uniform Resource Name Resolution

 

RFC 2535

Domain Name System Security Extensions

Recommended

RFC 2592

http://www.armware.dk/RFC/rfc/rfc2592.htmlDefinitions of Managed Objects for the Delegation of Management Script

 

RFC 2874

http://www.armware.dk/RFC/rfc/rfc2874.htmlDNS Extensions to Support IPv6 Address Aggregation and Renumbering

 

ISO 10202-1:1991

Financial transaction cards -- Security architecture of financial transaction systems using integrated circuit cards -- Part 1: Card life cycle

Recommended Reading

ISO 10202-7:1998

Financial transaction cards -- Security architecture of financial transaction systems using integrated circuit cards -- Part 7: Key management

 

 

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